Abstract
Introduction
The board of directors is supposedly a collection of individuals with heterogeneous competencies and capabilities pooled together to perform monitoring and advisory functions in a company (Walt and Ingley, 2003) . Accordingly, the issue of what constitutes the correct mix of individuals and how these individuals improve board outcomes is of regulatory concern. The aftermath of each and every corporate governance failure has caused regulators to look inward and to see how boardroom composition and functions could be reformed to provide an effective oversight function (Ararat, Aksu and Cetin, 2015; Gul, Srinidhi and Tsui, 2008) . This is critical most especially in countries where external monitoring mechanisms are practically non-existent and investors and regulators look forward to the monitoring role of the board of directors (Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008) . Most corporate governance regulatory requirements have laid emphasis on boardroom composition and demands for diversity in skills, knowledge and social representativeness of boardroom members.
The theoretical justification behind such requirements is found in both the agency theory and the resources dependency theory. The agency theory underscores the importance of boardroom diversity in ensuring an effective and independent board monitoring function. Meanwhile, the resource dependency theory establishes the significant role played by the board of directors in connecting a firm with the external resources needed for its survival; hence, the need exists for boardroom structures to be a reflection of the society in which it operates (Walt and Ingley, 2003) . As it can be deduced from the two theories, boardroom diversity could improve board processes and outcomes. This is because individuals have distinct intellectual and social traits that are best harnessed when correctly pooled together. Diversity can be seen as the pool of differences among board members with respect to individual inherent traits and characteristics (Kearney, Gebert and Voelpel, 2009 ). Consistent with the agency theory postulation, this current study aims to investigate the relationship between boardroom diversity and the intensity of demand for audit service through the amount paid as audit fees in Nigeria.
As noted in Simunic's (1980) audit production function, audit charges reflect the expected efforts expended during an audit engagement and auditor risk exposure. While research on audit fees is abundant, further investigation on their relationships with boardroom diversity has, to the best of our knowledge, yet to receive sufficient empirical attention, most especially in the context of Nigeria.
Nigeria is an interesting setting in which to study board diversity in the context of an emerging market because Nigerian society is culturally diverse. Nigeria, society comprises more than 200 ethnic groups divided along three prominent groups, namely, Hausa, Yoruba and Igbos. This composition is differently configured than countries like Malaysia in which similar studies have been conducted. For example, Malaysian law recognizes two groups: Bumiputera and nonBumiputera. Those who are Bumiputera are known as "sons of the soil", and the Bumiputera ethnic group (Malays) are economically and politically favoured over the non-Bumiputera ethnic group, which comprises the Chinese and Indians. Conversely, the three ethnic groups in Nigeria have equal rights and claims to the political and economic resources of the country, hence no ethnic group is favoured. Therefore, boardroom heterogeneity with respect to ethnicity to reflect the cultural dynamics in Nigeria society is imperative to promote effectiveness in companies (Adegbite, 2015) . As noted one interviewee in Adegbite's study of corporate governance, "boards with sufficient tribal diversity are considered to have better governance systems and will further have a sense of belonging and identity throughout the country" (Adegbite, 2015, p. 16) . This observation suggests that the presence of members of the three ethnic groups on a board might contribute positively to corporate performance with respect to a wealth of experiences and networking. It would be interesting as well to see how the presence of these three ethnic groups affects audit quality.
In addition, corporate governance practice as a "distinct concept" is of recent origin in Nigeria (Ofo, 2013) Therefore, investigating how a composite measure of boardroom diversity cushions the effect of the agency problem in Nigeria context is interesting. Using a sample of firms from 2010 to 2011, evidence is provided supporting the theoretical preposition that board diversity enhances the board's monitoring role as it creates room for more independence in the boardroom. Specifically, we show that the extent of boardroom diversity is associated with the demand for more audit effort expressed by audit fees. Similarly, we test individual diversity proxies, and our findings reveal that all the three proxies exhibit a positive relationship, however only with the proportion of foreign directors in the boardroom. Our findings provide insights to regulators and investors on how corporate structure and operating results affect audit pricing. Therefore, the study extends and contributes to the body of knowledge in corporate governance and audit fee literature by using data from a less regulated environment.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides a literature review and the hypothesis for the study. Data and method of sampling are discussed in Section 2, and the research design/methodology in Section 3. The results and the analysis are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 includes a summary of our findings, implications and limitations of our findings, and suggestions for future studies.
Literature review and hypotheses development
Numerous studies have examined the relationships between board characteristics and board process outcomes such as firm performance (Amran Further, other studies on the intensity of audit demand have established a relationship between board characteristics and audit pricing. The argument has been made that an independent and diligent board will demand a high quality audit service due to the incentive to protect board reputational capital, reduce board litigation risks and safeguard shareholder interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1990 
Research design and variable measurements
Based on the theoretical framework and the hypothesis that was developed, the conceptual model of auditing pricing introduced by Simunic (1980) as extended by
Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993) and Boo and Sharma (2008) was adopted in this study. A panel data regression model was used to examine the relationship between boardroom diversity and audit fees along with firm specific variables to control for company size, complexity and audit risk. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 123 observations for the firms that were employed to run the audit fees model. The table presents the mean, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation values. As shown in Table 3 , the audit fees for the sampled companies ranged between 400,000 Naira and 135,000,000 Naira (foreign exchange rate is 165 Naira for 1 dollar), and foreign-owned companies represented by FOR had a mean value of 0.21%, the mean value for boardroom ETHNIC representation was 0.51% and INDP mean value was 0.49%. The value for individual concentrated ownership (BLKSHR) ranged between 0.05% and 0.99% and the maximum value of managerial ownership (MGROWN) was 3.79%. The results also showed that RISKCOM and CORPCOM had mean values of 36% and 28% respectively, indicating that less than half of the sampled companies had established a risk management committee and a corporate governance committee. The mean number of foreign directors on the board was 21%. 
Results of the analysis

Preliminary analysis
Tests for random and fixed effects regression
The choice between random and fixed effects was based on the Hausman test (Green, 1997). In order to choose the appropriate model, the Hausman test was run because the Hausman test checks whether the errors (U i ) are correlated with the regressors. If pro > chi2 is < 0.05 (i.e., significant) the fixed effect model is used (Greene, 1997 ). The Hausman test shows a probability greater than 0.05, so the null hypothesis was rejected; hence, the random effects model is appropriate for the study. By implication, the individual error component is not correlated with the regression variabiles, thus OLS estimator is consistent. Table 4 presents the generalist square random regression results. A good linear fit was achieved with an adjusted R 2 of 64%. This suggests that the model explains more than of the 60% variation between the dependent variable and the independent variable. The regression coefficient for the composite measure of board dynamics (TBD) in model 1 was positive and significant in predicting the amount paid as audit fees by Nigerian publicly listed companies. The finding is consistent with the agency theory, which states that an effective board will be more thorough in their monitoring role and therefore will make more demands in an audit engagement. Next, the regression coefficient for nationality of members of the board of director (FOR) in model 2 was positive and significant indicating that in order to be more transparent, foreign directors will pay more for audit services to ensure the credibility of financial statements and protect the reputations of the directors (Ahmad, Houghton and Yusof, 2006) . In model three, the coefficient of boardroom ethnic balance (ETHNIC), which indicates the presence of the three prominent ethic groups in Nigeria in the boardroom, the coefficient was positive although not significant. Lastly, in model 4, the coefficient for the percentage of independent directors (INDP) was positive but not significant. : * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% and *** = significant at 1% Source: Authors' compilation, 2016 Across the three models the coefficient of individual block shareholders (BLKSHR) was positive and significant, although in model 2 the coefficient was not significant. The coefficient of managerial ownership was significant and negative across the three models. With respect to board risk committee (RISKCOM), the coefficient was negative and significant in the three models, and, for the corporate governance committee (CORPCOM), the coefficient was positive and significant in all the three models. In addition, and consistent with prior literature, firm-specific control variables such as client size proxy by log of turnover (LOGTO), client complexity proxy by number of subsidiaries (SUB) and the ratio of inventory to total assets (RITA) and client risk proxy by long term debt to total assets (GEARING) were all significant and in line with the findings of prior studies. Likewise, the coefficient of the proxy for Big4 auditors for auditor characteristics (BIG4) was positive and significant in all the three models.
Results of model
Conclusion
Factors determining auditors' fees have been of great interest owning to the likely threat of high fees to auditors' independence. Similarly, boardroom diversity is widely being touted with the claim that it improves the oversight function of the board of directors. To examine such issues in the context of Nigeria, this study looked at the effect of boardroom diversity on audit demand expressed by audit fees. Overall, the paper contributes to the investigation on the diversity-audit demand relationship by showing that multiple diversity attributes have a compound effect on the extent of audit demand. The results found that the total board diversity (TBD) index developed in this study impacted the demand of the board of directors for audit services more significantly than the individual diversity attributes as TBD enhanced audit demand. This finding is consistent with theoretical justification that boardroom diversity improves the monitoring function of the board of directors because the board will likely comprise individuals with independent minds (Walt and Ingley, 2003) . According to Carcello et al. (2002) and Knechel and Willekens (2006) , independent and diligent board of directors will demand high-quality audit services to safeguard their reputations and avoid litigation risks arising from non-performance.
The current study's finding reflecting the Nigeria context may provide more relevant and interesting conclusions for emerging markets that exhibit similar corporate governance features most especially in countries with type two agency problems and with weak implementation and enforcement mechanisms. Based on this study, regulators could consider improving boardroom diversity, most especially with respect to the individual diversity features examined, would be an excellent measure to improve the effectiveness of boards of directors in Nigeria.
Like any other empirical study of this nature, this research is imperfect and has limitations requiring that the findings be interpreted within the purview of the highlighted limitations. The first limitation arises from the limited generalizability of the study. This is due to the small sample size and single country context that was necessitated due to the hand collection of data, the availability of data at the time of data collection and the need to control for institution differences in the sample. In addition, the present study excludes banks and other financial institutions due to their reporting structures. To this extent, the results of the sample may suffer from sample bias. Although the sample is a replica of many other emerging markets, future studies could use longitudinal data and adapt the model used in this current study to provide more robust findings.
Second, contextual variables capturing corporate governance practices in Nigeria that are distinct from what are obtainable anywhere else should be introduced in future studies on audit pricing in Nigeria. Probably, such variables could serve to explain the variations in audit fees better within the Nigerian context. Such variables could emanate from ownership structure types in the country or the dominance of one ethnic group in the board structure, if possible, in line with the risk averseness and business shrewdness of each ethnic group. Similarly, future studies could capture the overall effects of regulatory changes in the Nigerian financial reporting architecture and investigate how these affect the audit market as a whole.
Third, non-audit fees are lumped together with audit fees in the annual reports and consequently the study used auditor's remuneration. However, the study does not expect non-separate disclosure of these fees to affect the findings of the study because it is less relevant in Nigeria.
Lastly, consistent with resource dependency theory, future studies within this regulatory setting could examine the impact of networking of politically connected firms and board negotiation skills on audit pricing.
